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ABSTRACT 
 
Gabriel Moss: Watering the Roman Legion 
(Under the direction of Richard Talbert) 
 
 
This thesis investigates how ancient Roman legions provisioned fresh water while on 
campaign, arguing that water logistics were an important limit on Rome’s ability to defend the 
empire.  Using comparative data, this thesis estimates the hefty water requirements of a Roman 
army in the field and argues that the limits of preindustrial transportation technology compelled 
commanders to stick close to local water supplies except in the most urgent circumstances.  After 
a discussion of what water sources ancient armies could tap, this thesis turns to investigate how 
the reliance on local water sources limited the strategic maneuverability of Roman forces.  
Through GIS analysis of water sources along the Roman frontier in Tripolitania, it demonstrates 
that large swaths of nominally “Roman” territory were inaccessible to Roman troops, and that 
the strictures of water logistics made it challenging for the Roman Empire to adequately secure 
its desert frontiers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At its height, the Roman Empire’s borders stretched for thousands of kilometers around 
the Mediterranean world.  Roughly half of these borders abutted deserts.  From Gibraltar to 
Mesopotamia, the Roman frontier brushed against the vast arid zone stretching from the Sahara 
eastwards into Asia.  As a result, the Romans’ ability to win and defend the huge sectors of 
territory to their south and east depended to a great extent on the ability of imperial armies to 
function in areas where water was scarce. 
Given the importance of desert operations to imperial security, it is remarkable that no 
scholars have thoroughly addressed Roman military water logistics.  Only two consider the 
question at all: Jonathan Roth briefly discusses water requirements and water provisioning 
methods as part of a longer monograph on Roman military logistics.1  Experimental 
archaeologist Marcus Junkelmann provides valuable estimates of the amount of water required 
by Roman legionaries, but does not explore the implications of his figures at any length.2  A third 
scholar, Donald Engels, analyzes water logistics and military geography, and their combined 
effect on the strategy of Alexander’s eastern campaigns; though not about the Roman military, 
his work provides valuable comparanda and largely influences the methodological approach of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Roth (1999). 
  
2Junkelmann (1997), pp. 172-175. 
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this paper.3  Beyond the works of these three men, the historiography of ancient military water 
supply is deserted. 
My thesis seeks to address this critical gap in our understanding of Roman military water 
logistics.  Using a variety of modern comparative evidence, it will estimate the volume of water 
required by Roman units in the field.  Analyzing literary sources and the quantitative limitations 
of ancient technology, it will evaluate the ability of Roman armies to operate independently of 
the water landscape by carrying large quantities of water with them.  Concluding that Roman 
campaigns, particularly by large forces, were generally limited to areas where water was locally 
available, I discuss what types of water sources Roman troops could use, arguing that only rivers 
and springs could typically meet the water requirements of an ancient army.  Finally, having 
constructed a general model of the techniques and limitations of Roman military water supply, I 
apply that model to an actual geographic landscape; using GIS analysis of water sources in 
Roman Tripolitania (the arid northwestern corner of modern Libya), I argue that the water 
requirements of a Roman army severely limited its ability to defend the empire’s desert frontiers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Engels (1978).   
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2. Quantitative Estimates of Roman Water Needs 
 
Our first question is a scientific one: how much water did Roman troops (and their 
animals) require to remain fit for service?  In principle, these figures should be simple to 
calculate.  After all, Roman men and animals were not notably different from their modern 
counterparts in biological terms.  Yet our calculations are complicated by the essential 
physiology of dehydration.  To put it bluntly, in order to know how much water a Roman soldier 
needed to drink, we need to know just how heavily he sweated.   
A Roman soldier, like any other human, must consume enough water through food and 
fluids to match the water lost through urination, defecation, and perspiration.  In the context of 
Roman desert warfare, we may safely ignore all factors except fluid intake and perspiration.  
Though the diet of Roman soldiers in garrisons included fruits, vegetables, and other water-rich 
foods, troops on desert marches carried “iron rations” of hardtack and pork-fat, foods which 
contributed little in the way of hydration.4  Except in cases of dysentery, water loss through 
defecation is minor, while urine output will drop below .5 L/day for humans in the desert heat.5  
Thus, we may simplify our calculations by assuming that the small amounts of water taken in 
through food will cancel out the small amounts lost through urination and defecation. 
 Desert hydration, therefore, is a relatively simple matter of matching water intake to 
perspiration.  When this balance is not maintained, dehydration begins.  Even before the onset of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Davies (1971). 
 
5Gauthier-Pilters & Dagg (1981), p. 170; Schmidt-Nielsen (1964), p. 11. 
 
	  	   4	  
any symptoms, dehydration may be evaluated by measuring weight loss: a soldier who sweats 2 
L but drinks only 1 L will have lost 1 kg and have a 1 L water deficit.  However, to judge the 
severity of dehydration it is necessary to measure weight loss as a percentage of total body mass: 
thus an 80 kg person who has lost 2 kg of water through perspiration will have roughly the same 
level of dehydration as a 40 kg person who has lost 1 kg.6   
The symptoms of dehydration appear as the percentage of weight loss increases.  
Dehydration up to 10% of body weight can be severely unpleasant but not fatal.7  However, 
dehydration incapacitates around 10%.  By 12% weight loss, humans become unable to swallow 
and can recover only through the medical administration of fluids.  Dehydration is fatal when 
weight loss reaches between 15% and 25% of body weight; at these levels, the human body 
becomes unable to regulate its temperature through perspiration.  Core temperature spikes above 
100° F with fatal results.8  
Given the physiology of dehydration, it is difficult to calculate a precise water 
requirement for the Roman soldier in the field.  After all, this requirement depends on the 
soldier’s rate of perspiration, which is itself dependent on his level of exertion, on his armor and 
equipment, and on the climate in which he operates.  Moreover, all evidence for the legionaries’ 
water needs must come by necessity from modern comparative data, all of it collected from 
subjects who were not (with a couple notable exceptions) working under the conditions of a 
Roman military campaign.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6Schmidt-Nielsen (1964), ch. 1.  On this point, I follow Schmidt-Nielsen rather than U.S. Army (1961), 
which relates the severity of dehydration to the total volume of water lost regardless of body mass. 
 
7Schmidt-Nielsen (1964), ch. 1.  Though not technically related to dehydration, it is worth noting that the 
levels of perspiration high enough to produce 10% dehydration can also cause severe salt deficiency with 
its own debilitating symptoms.  See Atkinson & Morgan (1987). 
 
8Schmidt-Nielsen (1964). 
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 In the face of these methodological challenges, we should hardly fault Engels and Roth 
(the only major analysts of ancient military logistics to address water at all) for not adequately 
exploring their estimates of ancient water needs.  Both historians claim that a soldier required 
two liters of water per day, with that requirement increasing with high temperatures and activity 
levels.9  This figure is problematic both in its scientific grounding and its general utility: in the 
deserts where water supply posed its greatest logistical challenge to ancient armies, soldiers 
required significantly more than 2 L/day. 
 Backtracking Engels and Roth’s citations reveals three sources for their 2 L/day figure.  
Engels cites the estimate in a 1930 Journal of Hellenic Studies article, in which Frederick 
Maurice analyzes the logistics of Xerxes’ 5th century invasion of Greece.10  Maurice gives no 
citation for his claim that slightly over 2 L of water would suffice for men marching in the heat 
of the Turkish summer; he presumably draws upon personal experience in the region during 
World War I.11 Roth takes his 2 L figure primarily from Engels himself, though it is tentatively 
suggested by two more sources.  U.S. Army nutrition guidelines from the 1960s recommend that 
servicemen drink only 1 L/day (though this assumes that the soldier’s diet provides an additional 
1.5 L of fluids).12  Based on estimates from our other sources, this figure must have been 
intended only for relatively inactive troops in very temperate weather.  Atkinson and Morgan, 
reporting on their experiments with Roman military reenactors, also suggest that 2 L/day would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9Engels (1978), p. 125; Roth (1999), pp. 35-40. 
 
10Maurice (1930), 223. 
 
11With Maurice (who gives his figure as 2 quarts) and all other sources, I have converted all 
measurements to metric equivalent.  Individual water requirements have been rounded to the nearest 
whole or half. 
     
12U.S. Army (1961), pp. 5-6. 
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be an acceptable water ration for a Roman legionary.13  However, both sources indicate that 
troops performing strenuous work in hot environments would require far more than 2 L/day of 
water; Atkinson and Morgan found 2 L inadequate at temperatures over 70° F, while the Army 
stated that troops in hot environments could require up to 2.5 gallons (9.5 L) of water per day. 
 Of Engels’ and Roth’s sources on ancient water requirements, one (Maurice) is of 
questionable scientific validity.  The other two readily admit that their numbers are not accurate 
for troops marching in the hot and dry environments where water logistics would present a 
serious problem to ancient generals.  A more reasonable figure comes from Marcus Junkelmann, 
the leading German scholar of Roman military logistics, who claims that a Roman legionary on 
the march required between 4.5 and 8.5 L of water per day, with the higher figure holding true in 
high temperatures.14  Furthermore, he states that 2 L would only be sufficient for a soldier not 
engaged in strenuous activity such as marching, construction, or combat.  Junkelmann bases 
these figures on his famous experimental recreation of a legion on the march, in which he led a 
small band of volunteers outfitted in reconstructed Roman equipment some 500 km from Verona 
over the Alps to Augsburg.15  As a result, his estimates should reflect the needs and 
circumstances of the ancient Roman soldier more accurately than those based on the experiences 
of British soldiers in Asia Minor or American G.I.s in Korea.16 
 Junkelmann’s work suggests that Engels and Roth’s 2 L/day figure may be inadequate 
even for troops in temperate climes.  A more recent nutritional report from the U.S. Army leads 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Atkinson & Morgan (1987), pp. 101-102. 
 
14Junkelmann (1997), pp. 172-175. 
 
15Junkelmann (1986). 
 
16Referring to Maurice (1930) and U.S. Army (1961). 
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to similar conclusions, stating that soldiers engaged in “light to moderate activity in a temperate 
climate” require 1 quart (.95 L) of water for every 1000 calories burned.17  By Roth’s own 
estimate, the average legionary burned 3000 calories per day, and thus would require just under 3 
L of water even in cool temperatures.18 
Leaving water requirements in moderate climates aside, we may be quite sure that 2 L of 
water per day is woefully inadequate for troops on desert campaigns.  Steven Sidebotham’s work 
on the ancient inhabitants of Egypt’s Eastern Desert indicates that 4-6 L/day is necessary in the 
Egyptian summer; more than 6 L may well have been necessary to maintain strenuous levels of 
physical activity (and marching under arms should certainly fall into this category).19  
Sidebotham’s estimate is supported by a particularly valuable set of ostraka from Mons 
Claudianus which lists the water rations for a community of 916 people at an early 2nd Century 
BCE mining site in the Eastern Desert.  Rations ranged from 6.5 L to roughly 2 L per day; the 
lower numbers are presumably for children, and since the ostraka appear to give the water rations 
for winter months, summer water requirements may well be higher.20 
Modern comparative data indicates that a 4-6 L/day water requirement for desert survival 
is, if anything, still too low for of our study of Roman legionaries.  The 2001 U.S. Army 
nutrition report cited above states that troops in warm environments require roughly 4-6 L of 
water per day, but that higher temperatures and activity levels can drive this number up.21  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17U.S. Army (2001), p. 4. 
 
18Roth (1999), p. 12. 
 
19Sidebotham (2011), p. 12; Zitterkopf & Sidebotham (1989), p. 164. 
 
20Cuvigny (2005); Sidebotham (2011), ch. 7; BAtlas (2000), 78 C4. 
 
21U.S. Army (2001), p. 5.  Note that U.S. Army (1961) claims that troops in hot environments can require 
up to 9.5 L/day of water. 
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U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recommends that manual laborers 
working in temperatures over 80° F consume roughly 1 L of water each hour, for a daily water 
requirement of 8-12 L.22 Schmidt-Nielsen draws a similar conclusion in his study of human 
physiology under high-temperature desert conditions.  He records human perspiration rates (as 
noted above, the most important cause of water loss in the desert) of roughly 1 L/hour, producing 
a daily water requirement of about 12 L.23 
In the face of these conflicting estimates, how may we best proceed to evaluate the water 
requirements of a Roman legionary?  As argued above, we may safely claim that Engels’ and 
Roth’s 2 L/day figure is far too low for soldiers in hot climates, and probably too low even for 
troops in cooler conditions.  Upon consideration of the available scholarship, 4-8 L/day seems a 
more adequate estimate, with the actual amount of water required depending on temperature and 
activity level.  In accord with Sidebotham and the more recent U.S. Army Nutrition guide, we 
may suspect that 4-6 L/day would be enough for legionaries under most circumstances.24  That 
said, expanding the range up to 8 L (after Junkelmann) includes the water needs of soldiers 
operating in particularly high temperatures or at particularly high levels of activity.25  In addition, 
water needs greater than 8 L/day are certainly possible. 4 L/day is a relatively hard “floor”: less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
22OSHA (2014). 
 
23Schmidt-Nielsen (1964). 
 
24Sidebotham (2011); U.S. Army (2001). 
 
25Junkelmann (1997). 
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water will not suffice except for inactive troops in cool climes.  But legions under the most 
grueling conditions of high-temperature combat could certainly surpass the 8 L/day “ceiling.”26 
Though the bottom half of our 4-8 L/day range was usually sufficient to meet the 
legionaries’ water requirements, wise Roman commanders would have “played it safe” and 
planned to provision more than 4-6 L of water per day.  Ancient generals could not predict the 
weather with anything near modern accuracy; on an unseasonably hot day, a commander who 
had only provisioned 4 L of water per man could rapidly find himself commanding a parched 
and ineffective army.27  Then as now, a general could not necessarily predict when combat 
would occur; he would need to be prepared for the exertion of melee fighting to sharply increase 
the water needs of his men.  In short, an army’s water supply always needed to be adequate for 
exceptional conditions, not for typical ones.  Out of necessary caution, Roman generals facing 
even the slightest threat of heat or combat would have been prudent to plan to provision at least  
6 L if not 8 L/day of water. 
***** 
Thus far we have focused on the water requirement of the Roman soldier.  However, a 
Roman general needed to provision water not only for his men, but also for the sizeable 
contingent of animals that accompanied his forces.  An imperial legion was typically 
accompanied by a contingent of 1,000 mules or donkeys and about 330 horses.28  The water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26The upper ranges of the Roman water requirement are suggested by Engels (1978), whose source in the 
Quartermasters Corps gave a water requirement of 10 L/day for desert campaigns.  See also, OSHA 
(2014); Schmidt-Nielsen (1964); U.S. Army (1961) gives 9.5 L/day as its maximum requirement for 
troops in high temperatures. 
 
27As illustration of this danger, see Plutarch, Ant. 47. 
 
28Hyland (1990), p. 38.  These figures assume a legion travelling without auxiliaries or camp-followers.  
On the possibility that Roman armies employed camels as pack-animals, see below, pp. 22-25. 
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requirements of these animals dwarfed that of their human masters.  Engels reports that equines 
(whether horse, donkey, or mule) have an average water requirement of 35 L/day.29 Roth gives 
figures of 15-30 L/day for horses and 20 L/day for mules and donkeys.30  Similarly, two 
monographs on the Roman cavalry estimate the water requirement of a Roman horse at between 
20 and 30 L/day.31  As with human water requirements, these estimates could certainly be 
inadequate for mounts and pack-animals in hot climates.  
If we take these figures at face value, the water requirements of a legion’s animals seem 
as pressing of those of its men.  Although soldiers outnumbered mounts and baggage animals by 
perhaps five to one, each beast’s water requirement far outstripped human needs.  Yet equine 
physiology may have lightened the burdens animals placed on Roman military water logistics.  
Despite the high water requirements suggested above, some evidence suggests that horses and 
pack-animals may have proved quite resistant to dehydration.  Anecdotal evidence from the First 
World War reports that British horses and mules could operate for impressive periods without 
water: near Darfur, one regiment “marched 90 miles in three nights and two days” without 
watering its mules.  In Gaza, at least one unit “marched and fought for nine consecutive days, 
during which its horses were only watered three times.”32 Schmidt-Nielsen’s experiments on 
donkeys in desert conditions support these claims, observing that donkeys can work for up to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29Engels (1978), p. 127.  This figure, which also appears in Maurice (1930), originates in Army 
Veterinary Department (1908), p. 129. 
 
30Roth (1999), pp. 62, 66-67. 
 
31Dixon and Southern (1992), p. 206; Hyland (1990), p. 96. 
 
32Preston (1921), p. 314.  
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four days without drinking.33  Equine physiology provides some explanation for this remarkable 
tolerance of thirst: donkeys can withstand dehydration up to 20% of their body weight without 
observable adverse effects, and can survive dehydration of up to 30% of body weight (as 
opposed to humans, who suffer at less than 10% and perish starting at 15%).34 
Equines’ ability to work without water for relatively long periods could have impacted 
the logistical calculations of Roman commanders.  We should by no means assume that generals 
planned to water their beasts only once every 2-4 days, even though the evidence above suggests 
this might have been possible.  As of yet, we have scanty evidence on how dehydration affected 
equine performance, and no evidence on whether an infrequent watering schedule was 
sustainable in the long term.  At least one ancient manual on agriculture and veterinary medicine 
gave advice for treating heat exhaustion and dehydration in overworked horses.35  Yet the 
resilience of donkeys and mules in particular may have added much needed flexibility to the 
Roman logistical apparatus in desert campaigns.  Roman commanders who needed to cross wide 
stretches of waterless terrain could load multiple days’ worth of water onto pack-animals, 
delaying their need to replenish their water supply in the field.36  As I argue below, this tactic 
was incredibly costly and difficult, requiring the fullest exertion of the Romans’ logistical 
capacities.  Yet carrying water across deserts must have been more manageable if a commander 
did not need to account for the water requirements of his pack-mules, trusting that the hardy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33Schmidt-Nielsen (1964), p. 89.  Army Veterinary Department (1908), p. 270 similarly remarks that 
donkeys and mules are “tolerant of thirst.” 
 
34Schmidt-Nielsen (1964), p. 89. 
 
35Varro, 2.1.22-23.  Also see McCabe (2007), p. 89. 
 
36See below, pp. 21-22. 
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beasts could survive until the next water source without tapping into the very water-skins they 
carried.         
In and of themselves, the human and equine water requirements presented above may not 
seem particularly challenging.  Even in the desert, a knowledgeable and resourceful human can 
obtain the 4-8 L of water required to sustain life.  Indeed, small groups of farmers and herders 
did just this in some of the most hostile locales along Rome’s southern frontier.37  Yet it was the 
sheer size of a Roman legion that made procuring adequate water in the desert such a daunting 
logistical challenge.  The general of an imperial legion needed to provide water for some 5,000 
legionaries, plus any auxiliary troops and noncombatant camp followers.38 As mentioned above, 
a single legion also travelled with some 1,330 mules, donkeys, and horses.  Using the figures 
estimated above, a legion in the desert (even without auxiliaries or noncombatants) has a daily 
water requirement of 51,500-71,500 L/day, with more prudent commanders planning to have 
supplies of water closer to the higher volume.39  For the sake of scale, this is equivalent to 55-75 
industrial pallets loaded with bottled water, and weighs roughly as much as an American M1 
Abrams tank (roughly 65 metric tons).  Such a vast quantity of water must have weighed heavily 
on the mind of any ancient commander; constrained by limited time and ancient technology, how 
would Roman armies best meet such imposing water requirements? 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37Barker et al. (1996). 
 
38On the size of the imperial legion, Le Bohec (1994), p. 35. 
 
39Calculations based on a water requirement of 30 L/day for horses, 20 L/day for mules, and 4-8 L/day for 
men.  Calculations rounded to the nearest 500. 
	  	   13	  
 
 
 
3. The Possibility and Improbability of Transporting Water 
 
In terms of strategic flexibility, the best option was for a Roman army to carry several 
days’ worth of water with it, thereby removing its dependence on local water sources and 
operating (at least for a time) independently of the hydro-geographic landscape.  Indeed, there is 
trustworthy textual evidence that on occasion sizeable Roman forces operated in areas without 
local sources of drinking water.  However, such episodes of desert campaigning are ultimately 
exceptional.  Both a preponderance of literary evidence and a quantitative analysis of ancient 
logistics technology suggest that while a Roman force could transport water over long distances 
to fulfill particularly crucial missions, it generally operated in near-constant proximity to potable 
water sources. 
 A Roman general at war faced the prospect of desert campaigning under two 
circumstances: either his army needed to march across a desert to reach its objective, or the 
enemy forced him to fight in a location with little or no available water.  Ancient texts recount 
episodes in which Roman legions operated successfully in both situations.  For desert crossings, 
Roman armies were certainly capable of carrying several days worth of water on the march.  
According to Sallust, in the late 2nd Century BCE the Roman general Metellus, while pursuing 
Jugurtha to the desert town of Thala, jettisoned all equipment save food and water from his pack 
animals and entered the wastes: “although he knew that between Thala and the nearest river lay 
fifty miles of dry and desolate country, yet in hope of ending the war by getting possession of so 
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important a town he undertook to surmount all the difficulties and even to defeat Nature 
herself.”40  When Metellus successfully reached Thala, Jugurtha was so overawed that he fled 
from the city rather than fight a man capable of such a feat.41  Later, Sallust recounts Marius’ 
forced march across the Numidian desert to the town of Capsa; like Metellus, Marius ordered his 
troops to abandon all their equipment and load themselves and their pack-animals with water 
alone.42  Ammianus reports a similar desert crossing by the emperor Jovian on the eastern 
frontier.  At the desert city of Hatra, “we learned that on a plain extending for seventy miles 
through dry regions only water that was salt and ill-smelling could be found…”43 Filling water 
vessels, the Romans crossed the wastes for six days before reaching the city of Ur.44 
In addition to transporting their own water supplies for desert marches, Roman legions 
sometimes conscripted their subjects and allies to provide water along their route.  Soldiers 
rushing to the battle of Metaurus in the Second Punic War may well have had their canteens 
refilled by the grateful citizens along their march.45  Metellus used just such a strategy in his 
aforementioned march to Thala: “he ordered all the people who dwelt near by (they had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40Sallust, Jug. 75: “quamquam inter Thalam flumenque proxumum in spatio milium quinquaginta loca 
arida atque vasta esse cognoverat, tamen spe patrandi belli, si eius oppidi potitus foret, omnis asperitates 
supervadere ac naturam etiam vincere aggreditur.” BAtlas (2000), 33 C1 Thala. 
 
41Sallust, Jug. 76. 
 
42Sallust, Jug. 91; BAtlas (2000), 33 C4 Capsa (Iustiniana). Although Sallust reports that Marius ordered 
that his men and mule’s carry nothing except water, food was presumably transported as well, since 
Sallust himself reports in section 90 that there would be little chance for foraging on the desolate march to 
Capsa. 
 
43Ammianus, 25.8.6: “cognito per porrectam planitiem ad usque lapidem septuagensimum in regionibus 
aridis nec aquam inveniri posse praeter salsam at faetidam.” BAtlas (2000), 91 D2 Hatra. 
 
44Ammianus, 25.8.7; BAtlas (2000), 93 C3 Ur(i). 
 
45Livy, 27.45; BAtlas (2000), 42 D1 Metaurus. Though Livy makes no specific reference to water supplies 
here, locals donated all manner of supplies to the Roman troops, potentially including fresh water. 
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surrendered to Metellus after the flight of the king) to bring each as much water as he could, 
naming the day and the place where they were to appear.”46 According to Josephus, King Herod 
provided a similar service to Octavian during his campaigns in Egypt, providing “an abundance 
of water” for legions on the march near Pelusium.47 
Whether by their own resources or by outside aid, Roman armies could evidently venture 
relatively brief desert crossings, operating at a distance from potable water sources for days at a 
time.  Ancient authors also provide a handful of cases in which stationary legions in hostile and 
waterless areas (typically conducting siege operations) imported water to their positions over 
long distances.  When Caesar was fighting in Alexandria and the Egyptian general Ganymedes 
rendered his water supplies undrinkable, he reassured his nervous troops that fresh water could 
be imported by sea: “since they held unfettered command of the sea, while their enemies had no 
fleet, they could not be prevented from seeking water daily in their ships."48 Pompey relied on 
similar tactics shortly before the Battle of Dyrrhachium during his civil war against Caesar; when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46Sallust, Jug. 75: “Ad hoc finitumis imperat, qui se post regis fugam Metello dederant, quam plurumum 
quisque aquae portaret; diem locumque, ubi praesto fuerint, praedicit.”  Though Sallust is somewhat 
unclear on this point, it appears that Metellus compelled locals to build a makeshift reservoir several days 
into his march, establishing a depot to replenish his water supplies. 
 
47Josephus, BJ, 1.394-395: “προυνόησεν δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου πορευοµένοις µέχρι Πηλουςίου 
παρασχεῖν ὕδωρ ἄφθονον ἐπανιοῦσί τε ὁµοίως.” BAtlas (2000), 74 H2 Pelusium. According to 
Herodotus, the Persians employed a similar strategy in Egypt, compelling the inhabitants of Memphis to 
fill amphorae with water and transport them to the Syrian desert in the north, thereby providing drinking 
water along the desiccated routes from the Persian core territories into Egypt.  Herodotus, 3.6; BAtlas 
(2000), 75 E1 Memphis. 
 
48Caesar, B.Alex., 8: “quoniam mare libere tenerent, neque hostes classem haberent, prohiberi sese non 
posse quo minus cotidie navibus aquam peterent.” BAtlas (2000), 74 B2 Alexandria. As it happened, 
Caesar was able to secure an adequate water supply by digging wells and did not resort to dispatching 
ships to obtain water. 
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Cesarean troops prevented his fleet from landing to take on fresh water, “they were obliged to 
bring up by merchant-ships from Corcyra supplies of wood and water as of other stores…"49  
Romans and their contemporaries were also capable of importing water by land, though 
the effort involved must have been prohibitive.  When Herod built his eponymous fortress of 
Herodium on the Arabian frontier, “he had, at immense expense, an abundant supply of water 
brought into it from a distance."50 Roman troops as the siege of Masada, the last major action 
against the Jewish Rebellion in the first century C.E., faced a similar logistical challenge, “for 
not only were supplies conveyed from a distance, entailing hard labor for the Jews told off for 
this duty, but even water had to be brought into the camp, there being no spring in the 
neighborhood."51  Even relying on conscripted labor, this water provisioning strategy must have 
been prohibitively difficult, a testament to the Roman commitment to crush the last remaining 
Jewish rebels. 
 This textual evidence indicates that in urgent situations it was certainly possible for 
Roman legions to overcome the logistical challenges of water provisioning in desert 
environments.  After all, Ammianus, Caesar, and Josephus are relatively reliable narrators with 
military experience.  Sallust is less so, but even his accounts seem plausible.  That said, we 
should not conclude that the campaigns recounted above were standard practice for the Roman 
military.  Roman commanders in these instances braved the desert in pursuit of crucial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49Caesar, B.Civ., 3.15: “cogerentur sicuti reliquum commeatum ita ligna atque aquam Corcyra navibus 
onerariis supportare.” BAtlas (2000), 49 B2 Dyrrhachium, 54 A2 Corcyra. 
 
50Josephus, BJ, 1.419-421: “πόρρωθεν δὲ µεγίστοις ἀναλώµασιν ὑδάτων πλῆθος εἰσήγαγεν.” BAtlas 
(2000), 70 G2 Herodeion. 
 
51Josephus, BJ, 7.276-279: “οὐ γὰρ ἡ τροφὴ µόνον πόρρωθεν ἐκοµίζετο καὶ σὺν µεγάλῃ ταλαιπωρίᾳ τῶν 
ἐπὶ τοῦτο τεταγµένων Ἰουδαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποτὸν ἦν ἀγώγιµον [εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον] τοῦ τόπου 
µηδεµίαν ἐγγὺς πηγὴν ἀναδιδόντος.” BAtlas (2000), 70 G3 Masada. 
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objectives.  Metellus crossed the North African desert in a bid to capture Jugurtha and avenge an 
embarrassing string of Roman defeats.52  Caesar considered importing water by sea while 
battling for Alexandria, jewel of the Nile and the granary of Rome.53  And Roman forces 
besieged waterless Masada in a bid to end five years of catastrophic, intractable rebellion.54  
These were missions that justified the greatest exertion of the legions’ logistical capabilities.  For 
less important missions, the inefficiency of ancient technology and the strategic risks involved 
with transporting water supplies in desert areas compelled commanders to stay close to local 
water sources. 
***** 
Above, we estimated the vast water requirements of even a single Roman legion.  The 
transportation resources necessary to carry such a volume of water would have been massive, 
and the literary descriptions of desert campaigns suggest that the army’s pack-animals would 
have borne the burden.55  How many pack-animals would a Roman general need to load down 
with water in order to march across waterless tracts of desert?  Relying on a mix of modern and 
ancient evidence, Roth estimates the carrying capacity of a Roman mule at 135 kg and the 
capacity of a Roman donkey at 100 kg, although both figures would probably decrease on desert 
marches.56  Since each liter of water weighs one kilogram, a mule could carry 135 L of water, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52Sallust, Jug. 75. 
 
53Caesar, B.Alex., 8. 
 
54Josephus, BJ, 5.276-279. 
 
55Sallust, Jug. 75, 91. 
 
56Roth (1999), pp. 198-208. 
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donkey could carry 100.  For the purposes of this simulation, we will be generous and assume 
that the Romans were using the more efficient mules. 
Suppose that our hypothetical desert crossing is undertaken by only a single imperial 
legion, travelling without auxiliaries or camp-followers.  As described above, this legion consists 
of some 5,000 men, 1,000 mules, and 330 horses.57  Its daily water requirement on desert 
campaign is somewhere between 51,500 L and 71,500 L, depending on temperature and activity 
level.  To clearly demonstrate the calculations involved in estimating the transportation 
requirements for this legion, let us begin with a very simplified simulation: our imperial legion is 
operating in a geographically anomalous desert, one which offers adequate supplies of food and 
fodder but no potable water.  Therefore, pack-animals need only transport enough water to 
sustain the legion for the duration of its crossing. 
To transport its water requirement for a single day, our legion would require between 
roughly 380 and 530 mules loaded solely with water skins.  Since the 1,000 mules typically 
assigned to a legion were already loaded with the army’s other gear, a general would need either 
to acquire 380-530 extra mules, or to repurpose 380-530 of his own pack-animals by abandoning 
the fifty- to seventy-thousand kilograms of equipment those mules would otherwise carry.58  
Obviously, multiple days of desert operations would increase the legions’ pack-animal 
requirement accordingly: a general would require 760-1,060 mules for two days’ water supply, 
1,140-1,590 for three, and so on.   
Though daunting, these figures could certainly be achieved.  Roman generals in the field 
had few qualms about requisitioning local resources; as long as our theoretical desert campaign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57See above, p. 12.  Le Bohec (1994), p. 35. 
 
58Roth (1999), ch. 2. 
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was launched from a reasonably well-populated area, its commander could potentially acquire 
the beasts he needed.  However, as Engels points out in his study of Macedonian logistics, the 
math behind transporting consumable supplies is significantly more complicated than the 
simplified calculations above.59  After all, the mules carrying our legion’s water would 
themselves need to be provisioned with water from the very water skins strapped to their backs.  
As a result, the actual carrying capacity of a mule decreases the longer it travels away from 
water.  A mule crossing a desert for a single day can deliver 115 L of water (135 L – 20 L drunk 
along the way).60  A mule crossing for two days can deliver just 95 L, and so on. 
Since mules drink a portion of their carrying capacity each day they spend away from 
water, the number of mules (N) necessary to provision an army during a desert march is 
expressed by the following equation, where D is equal to the number of days the legion spends 
away from water supplies, W is equal to the total daily water ration of the legion, and M is equal 
to the daily water requirement of a pack mule: 
N= (D * W)/(135 – (D * M)) 
Using 60,000 L/day as a moderate figure for the legion’s daily water requirement produces the 
following equation: 
N= (D * 60,000)/(135-(D * 20)) 
The following table represents the relationship between D and N: 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59Engels (1978), pp. 18-25. 
 
60On the daily water requirements for mules, see above, pp. 9-11.  
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Table 1: Mules Required for Water Transport in Desert Operations61 
Duration of Desert Operations in Days (D) Number of Mules Required (N) 
1 521 
2 1,263 
3 2,400 
4 4,364 
5 8,571 
6 24,000 
7 ∞ 
  
These numbers begin to indicate the scale of the logistical challenge posed by desert 
operations, particularly for longer campaigns.  Thanks to the exponential growth in N, even two-
day desert crossings presented significant difficulties, while longer treks rapidly became 
prohibitive.  Moreover, according to this simulation it was physically impossible for a Roman 
legion to operate for more than six days without somehow replenishing its water supplies; after 
roughly six days and 18 hours in the desert, each pack-mule would have consumed all 135 liters 
of water it set out with.  
 Moreover, it must be remembered that the numbers presented in Table 1 represent the 
requirements of a march through a very strange desert, one which provides adequate food and 
fodder but no potable water.  Suppose that our legion ventures into more realistic terrain, a desert 
that offers neither water nor adequate supplies of food and fodder.  The legion’s 5,000 soldiers 
could perhaps carry their own food requirements as prepared biscuit rations.62  However, mules 
would be required to carry sufficient fodder for themselves and the 330 cavalry mounts (horses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61This formula and calculations based on Engels (1978), p. 22. 
 
62Roth (1999), pp. 43, 51-53.  Roth estimates a daily biscuit ration at .57 kg, providing 1,950 calories.  
Unsupplemented, this provides significantly less than the 3,000 calories required daily by a Roman 
legionary (Roth, p. 12), but could perhaps have sustained operations for short periods of time. 
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require 9.5 kg of fodder per day, while mules require roughly 7.5 kg of fodder per day).63  For 
this more complex (but more accurate) simulation, we can recalculate the required number of 
pack-animals through a modified version of the previous formula, where D is the number of days 
spent in desert operations, W is the daily water requirement for the legion’s men and animals, F 
is the fodder requirement for 200 cavalry mounts and the 1,000 mules already loaded with the 
legion’s equipment, Mw is the daily water requirement of a mule, and Mf is the daily fodder 
requirement of a mule: 
N = (D * (W + F))/(135 – (D * (Mw + Mf))) 
Substituting in the correct figures (again using 60,000 L/day as the legion’s water requirement) 
produces the following formula: 
N = (D * (60,000 + 10,635))/(135- (D * (20 + 7.5))) 
The following table provides a more realistic calculation of the number of mules our legion 
would require for a desert campaign: 
Table 2: Mules Required for Water and Fodder Transport in Desert Operations64 
Duration of Desert Operations in Days (D) Number of Mules Required (N) 
1 657 
2 1,766 
3 4,036 
4 11,301 
5 ∞ 
 
These figures are significantly more imposing.  Desert campaigning for more than four 
days becomes impossible; Jovian’s water supplies during the six-day crossing from Hatra to Ur 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63These figures are admittedly problematic.  Roth is very hesitant to estimate animal rations even when 
grazing is available.  Roth (1999), pp. 62-67.  
64As above, this formula and calculations based on Engels (1978), p. 22. 
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(see above, p. 14) must have been supplemented by scattered wellsprings or local assistance.65  
Any desert march longer than one day would surpass the carrying capacity of our legion’s 
standard contingent of mules.  Even a single day of desert operations would require two thirds of 
the legion’s mules, requiring the commander to abandon vast quantities of materiel.  The figures 
produced by this simulation suggest that transporting water for desert campaigns was not merely 
a daunting prospect, but a prohibitive one. 
That said, the ability of horses and mules to work without water for several days at a time 
(tenuously suggested above, pp. 9-10) would potentially have made it much easier for Roman 
generals to transport water for their troops.  Leaving out animal water needs, the legion’s 5,000 
men need between 20,000 and 40,000 L of water per day.  As such, one day’s supply of water 
could be carried by roughly 150-300 mules, two days’ supply could be carried by 300-600, and 
so on.  These figures certainly look more attainable; a commander willing to temporarily 
dehydrate his animals could campaign with more freedom in desert environments.  Yet as I 
suggested above, we should be very cautious before suggesting that such a policy of deliberate 
dehydration was a matter of general practice.  First, this tactic could only be used for perhaps 
two days, four at the most.66  Second, repeatedly pushing animals up to their physiological 
breaking point could hardly be sustainable over the long term.  Would a Roman general be 
willing to risk the health and productivity of his animals for a couple days of desert operations?  
In general, we may safely assume that he would not.  Again, the difference between crucial 
missions and routine missions is key.  Metellus or Marius may have tolerated the dehydration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65Ammianus, 25.8.6-7. 
 
66Preston (1921), p. 314; Schmidt-Nielsen (1964), p. 89.  Army Veterinary Department (1908), p. 270. 
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their pack-mules in their exceptional cross-desert marches.67  Under more typical circumstances, 
such a risky strategy would probably have been avoided. 
 Though Roman commanders would be loath to intentionally dehydrate their pack-
animals, some might have struck upon an alternative method of water-transportation better suited 
to desert campaigning: camels.  Camels can survive on far less water than equines; even in high 
temperatures, camels can easily go without water for more than a week provided there is 
adequate grazing, and there are some reports of camels surviving 16 days of waterless 
marching.68  Even if grazing is impossible (bearing in mind that camels can consume desert 
plants inedible to equines), camels can work for 5-7 days without needing to drink.69  Moreover, 
camels can bear heavier loads than mules and donkeys, carrying roughly 250 kg compared to the 
mule’s 135.70  For these reasons and more, the use of camels as desert pack-animals had obvious 
advantages.71   
The Romans would certainly have encountered domesticated camels along the arid 
fringes of their empire.72  And in several cases, Roman generals employed these dromedaries as 
pack animals in order to survive long marches across the desert.  Corbulo used pack-camels in 
his campaign against the Parthians, while Jovian used the same tactic while returning from defeat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67Sallust, Jug. 75, 91. 
 
68Gauthier-Pilters and Dagg (1981), p. 53. 
 
69Irwin (2010), p. 19. 
 
70Irwin (2010), p. 24; Zimmerle (2012).  Irwin estimates 273 kg, Zimmerle estimates 240.  Both estimates 
are for the one-humped dromedary camels that the Romans would have encountered.  Bactrian camels, 
which dwell further east, could carry significantly more. 
 
71For a more complete list of the camel’s virtues on a desert campaign, see Carbuccia (1853), pp. 12-13. 
 
72Bulliet (1975), ch. 1, 4-5; Irwin (2010), ch. 6; Toplyn (2006); Wilson (1984); Zimmerle (2012). 
 
	  	   24	  
in Persia.73  According to Ammianus, the notorious Romanus demanded 4,000 camels from the 
citizens of Lepcis Magna, presumably for use in desert campaigning.74  The notoriously 
unreliable Historia Augusta provides a third account of Roman pack-camels, claiming that 
Alexander Severus employed them in the early 3rd century.75  In each case, the camels’ 
prodigious ability to work without water must have significantly eased the burdens of water 
logistics.   
One last set of calculations suggests just how useful camels would have been.  Supposing 
that a legion replaced its entire contingent of pack-mules with camels, its daily water 
requirement would drop to between 30,000 and 50,000 L.76 This daily water ration could be 
carried by between 120 and 200 camels.  Moreover, because camels can survive without drinking 
from their own water-skins, the number of pack-camels required for multi-day desert crossings 
scales linearly, rather than exponentially.  240-400 camels can carry two days’ worth of water, 
360-600 can carry three, and so on.  Though these are not insignificant totals, they appear far 
more manageable than the logistical requirements of an army using pack-mules. 
Despite their evident strengths, the Romans do not seem to have made camels their 
default beasts of burden for desert campaigns.  With the exception of the four passages cited 
above, I have found no literary evidence that the Roman military used camels as pack-animals. 
Even the passages that mention this practice suggest its rarity: on Corbulo’s campaign, Tacitus 
writes, “Accompanying the army—apart from the usual war apparatus—was a large number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73Ammianus, 25.8; Tacitus, Ann. 15.12.   
 
74Ammianus, 28.6. 	  
75HA Alexander Severus, 47. 
 
76This total based on 5,000 men consuming 4-8 L/day, and 330 horses consuming 30 L/day.  For 
simplicity’s sake, I have left out the 3,135 kg of fodder which the legion’s 330 horses would also require. 
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camels laden with grain, so Corbulo could ward off both hunger and the enemy.”77  Clearly, in 
Tacitus’ experience camels were not standard issue for the Roman baggage train.  Similarly, both 
Ammianus and the Historia Augusta indicate that camels were used to supplement, not replace, 
traditional equine pack-animals.78  Even in situations where camels might have been more 
effective, pack-mules held on to their customary position in the Roman army—the men 
responsible for baggage trains took the title muliones, and "Mules were the most esteemed 
transport animals of the roman army."79  Camels may certainly have been employed more 
frequently by detachments of auxiliaries, who were more familiar with its use—Trajan and 
Hadrian evidently established auxiliary camel-cavalry units in Syria and Egypt.80  Yet in the 
large, legionary armies which waged the empire’s major wars, pack-camels appear to have been 
rare. 
It is impossible to say for certain why the Romans did not make more frequent use of 
camels.  The high purchase price of dromedaries may have played a role; papyri from Egypt 
suggest that a camels cost twice as much as mules, if not more.81  Institutional inertia may also 
have dissuaded innovation.  An army that had soldiers experienced in handling mules, that had 
systems in place to procure and care for mules, and that by long tradition had grown accustomed 
to mules in its baggage train was not likely to adopt pack-camels except in situations of direst 
need.  Whatever the reason, camels were rarely the Romans’ preferred baggage animal.  In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77Tacitus, Ann. 15.12.  “comitabantur exercitum praeter alia sueta bello magna vis camelorum onusta 
frumenti ut simul hostem famemque depelleret.” Translation is from Yardley’s 2008 Oxford World 
Classics edition, not from the badly archaic Loeb.  Emphasis is my own. 
 
78Ammianus, 25.8; HA Alexander Severus, 47. 
 
79Toplyn (2006), p. 493; Dixon and Southern (1992), p. 235. 
 
80Bulliet (1975), p. 107; Irwin (2010), p. 144. 	  
81Johnson (1936), pp. 230-232. 
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absence of specific evidence, we cannot be certain that any given desert campaign did not 
employ camels.  At the same time, however, we should not imagine that the use of pack-camels 
was widespread, and that Roman armies could easily launch desert campaigns as a result.  The 
Romans remained firmly bound by pre-industrial limits on the transportation of water, and shied 
away from all but the most critical desert campaigns as a result. 
*****      
This reconstruction of the harsh quantitative limits on ancient water transportation is 
reinforced by an array of textual evidence suggesting that Roman commanders avoided desert 
warfare even to the detriment of their military objectives.  In a number of cases, generals 
retreated rather than risk water shortages.  Faced with the threat of thirst during his North 
African campaigns, the normally decisive Julius Caesar was vacillating and ineffectual.  
Contemplating a siege of Thysdra in 46 BCE, “Caesar studied the characteristics of the town, 
and the lack of water discouraged him from attacking it: he then set out forthwith and pitched a 
camp some four miles away near water, only to quit it at the fourth watch.”82 Shortly thereafter, 
he retreated again despite the jeers of his foes: “realizing that it was equally impossible for him 
to pitch his own camp closer to the enemy owing to the poor supply of water, and perceiving that 
his opponents…were led to hold him in contempt by their reliance on the dearth of water, Caesar 
left Aggar on April 4th at the third watch."83 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82Caesar, B.Afr., 76: “Caesar oppidi natura perspecta aquae inopia ab oppugnatione eius deterritus 
protinus profectus circiter milia passuum IV ad aquam facit castra atque inde quarta vigilia egressus 
redit.” BAtlas (2000), 33 G2 Thysdrus. 
 
83Caesar, B.Afr., 79: “neque ipse propius hostem castra ponere propter aquae penuriam se posse 
animadvertebat, adversarios non virtute eorum confidere sed aquarum inopia fretos despicere se intellexit, 
II Non. Apr. tertia vigilia egressus ab Aggar XVI milia nocte.”  BAtlas (2000), 33 G1 Aggar? 
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Other passages describe certain towns as inaccessible to Roman troops due to a lack of 
water in their surrounding hinterlands.  In Spain, Ursao was thoroughly isolated from military 
incursions: “apart from a single fountain in the town itself, there was no water to be found 
anywhere in the neighborhood under eight miles from the town; and this was a great advantage 
to the townsfolk."84  The town of Singara on Rome’s eastern frontier was similarly inaccessible 
thanks to its waterless surroundings, though Ammianus reports that this isolation worked against 
the beleaguered townsfolk, since “even in former days no one had ever been able to aid Singara 
when in trouble, since all the surrounding country was dried up from lack of water."85  If desert 
operations were commonplace, Caesar and Ammianus (two of our more strategically 
knowledgeable authors) would hardly have considered Ursao and Singara beyond the reach of 
Roman legions.  
 The evidence above directly testifies to legionary commanders’ refusal to launch desert 
campaigns.  It is obliquely supplemented by a wide variety of sources indicating the care that 
Roman commanders took to ensure their water supplies, and the likelihood that generals would 
not readily run the risk of desert operations.  The threat of thirst motivated several maneuvers 
during Caesar’s civil wars: in North Africa, Scipio was forced to give battle when Caesar’s 
troops threatened the town of Uzitta, “on which [Scipio’s] army had been accustomed to rely for 
its water supply and all other means of support.”86 Three centuries later in a speech reported by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84Caesar, B.Hisp., 41: “Huc accedebat ut aqua praeter quam in ipso oppido unam circumcirca nusquam 
reperiretur propius milia passuum VIII; quae res magno erat adiumento oppidanis.” BAtlas (2000), 27 A4 
Urgao/Vircao. 
 
85Ammianus, 20.6.8-9: “alioqui numquam labenti Singarae vel temporibus priscis quisquam ferre 
auxilium potuit aquarum penuria cunctis circum arentibus locis.” BAtlas (2000), 89 D4. 
 
86Caesar, B.Afr., 41: “unde aquari reliquisque rebus sublevari eius exercitus consuerat.” BAtlas (2000), 33 
G1 Uzita. 
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Ammianus, the Emperor Julian tried to temper his troops’ bloodlust just before his victory at 
Strasburg, worrying that thirst would handicap their performance: “the country is fairly ablaze 
with heat and relieved by no supply of water....What strength can we have, when our limbs are 
enfeebled with hunger, thirst, and toil, to offer resistance?"87  
Commanders would rush or delay battle to secure their water supplies.  They would 
forego military goals for fear of thirst.  While so clearly aware of the importance of water 
provisioning, would they blithely undertake desert campaigns for anything less than the most 
crucial objectives?  The answer must be no.  A Roman general would have thought long and hard 
before leaving riverbanks or oases, weighing the cost and risk of desert campaigns.  Except in the 
rare cases when the desert promised exceptional rewards, Roman legions stuck close to water 
sources, replenishing their water stores at least once a day, and desert campaigns remained a 
logistical possibility only rarely undertaken. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87Ammianus, 16.12.11: “terrae protinus aestu flagrantes nullis aquarum subsidiis fultae…quo vigore 
inedia siti laboreque membris marcentibus occurramus?” BAtlas (2000), 11 H4 Argentorate. 
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4. Water “Foraging” and Local Water Sources 
 
Since transporting water was not a strategy the Romans were generally willing to 
undertake, under normal circumstances the empire’s troops could only operate in areas with local 
water sources adequate to meet their needs.  Before we attempt to locate such sites on a map, it is 
necessary to examine what types of water sources were actually available to a Roman army. 
 A thoroughly deficient literary record limits our understanding of what water sources 
legionaries could exploit.  Ancient accounts of the Roman military understandably prefer 
narratives of cunning generalship and glorious combat to the humdrum technicalities of routine 
water provisioning.  The few descriptions of water logistics we possess tend to discuss 
exceptional cases, episodes in which remarkable Roman military ingenuity, “undertook even to 
defeat Nature herself.”88  Nevertheless, ancient literature is littered with scattered evidence for 
more routine water provisioning.89  The utility of this evidence is undeniably limited.  It cannot 
say how any particular force gathered water at any particular location during any particular 
campaign.  What this evidence can do, however, is lay out a set of preferences and possibilities.  
It suggests a general practice of Roman water supply, what most legions and their commanders 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88Sallust, Jug. 75.  See above, p. 13. 
 
89A large number of these references do not mention what type of water source troops were exploiting.  
Nevertheless, these reports stress that in situ water gathering was a quotidian practice for the Roman 
army, and support the argument of this paper that areas without local water sources were generally 
inaccessible to Roman forces: Caesar, B.Afr., 24; B.Civ., 1.66, 73; B.Hisp., 21; Cassius Dio, 65.4; 
Frontinus, Strat., 1.8.9, 3.9.3; Josephus, B.J., 3.85-86; Plutarch, Sert., 7.3; Polybius, 6.27.3; Sallust, Jug., 
93.  
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would choose to do under most circumstances.  More importantly, this evidence illuminates the 
physical and physiological limits to the possibilities of Roman warfare: the in situ availability of 
drinking water was a critical factor in determining where a Roman army could campaign without 
incurring the heavy costs and risks of water transport. 
As a general rule, Roman legions preferred water sources that were flowing and 
aboveground, namely rivers (and smaller watercourses) and naturally occurring springs.  In 
Polybius’ account of the First Punic War, a giant serpent attacks Roman soldiers gathering water 
at an African river.90  Less colorful sources on the late Republic show Metellus securing a 
riverine water supply during the Jugurthine wars, Crassus’ army watering at a stream in Parthia, 
and Pompey’s forces seeking river water in Asia Minor.91 Finally, Trajan’s Column contains an 
image of a legionary filling a vessel with water at a riverbank; in what may well have been a 
standard practice, the soldier kneels upon wooden planks laid down at the bank to keep his boots 
from stirring up mud.92   
Accounts of legions collecting spring-water are somewhat more rare than mentions of 
rivers, though not by enough to imply that legionaries definitely preferred one to the other.  
Nero’s general Corbulo, while fortifying the banks of the Euphrates, took care to secure local 
springs in order to both provision his forces and deny water to the enemy.93  Later in the first 
century during the siege of Jerusalem, the future emperor Titus relied on springs surrounding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90Polybius, 4.12. 
 
91Respectively: Sallust, Jug. 50; Plutarch, Crass., 23.4-5; Caesar, B.Civ.. 3.66. 
 
92Webster (1985), p. 169.  The image can also be viewed online via the Cheiron Project at McMaster 
University (cheiron.mcmaster.ca/~trajan), Scene 107. 
 
93Tacitus, Ann. 15.3. 
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city; Josephus reports that these normally temperamental water-sources flowed particularly 
strongly due to Titus’ abiding good fortune.94 
The advantages of flowing surface-water, whether from watercourses or springs, are self-
evident.  These sources provide high volumes of water and require minimal labor on the part of 
the water-gatherer.95  Unlike wells, rivers and spring-fed oases can be accessed by many people 
and animals simultaneously, allowing water to be gathered quite efficiently.  As I discuss below, 
gathering water for any sizeable force was a time-consuming chore, but the local availability of 
aboveground water made this task relatively manageable.  For this reason, Hyginus’ military 
manual recommends that commanders locate their nightly camps near a spring or river.96 
Though rivers and springs were evidently the legions’ preferred water source, they were 
not without their drawbacks.  Not all rivers and springs are potable, and a Roman army operating 
in foreign territory would not necessarily know the quality of a given water source until it was 
too late.  Thus Marc Antony suffered grievous casualties in his Parthian campaign when his 
troops, parched from a long and waterless march, found that the desperately needed river at the 
end of their journey was poisonous.97  In addition, since rivers and streams lie aboveground, they 
were easy for an enemy to poison.  Jugurtha contaminated springs in Metellus’ path during 
Rome’s second century BCE wars in North Africa, and African locals used a similar tactic some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94Josephus, BJ, 5.409-410; BAtlas (2000), 70 G2 Ierusalem/Hierosolyma/Col. Aelia Capitolina. 
 
95The labor involved in scooping drinking water into vessels was certainly not negligible, but paled in 
comparison to digging wells or transporting water over long distances (see below, pp. 31-33). 
 
96Pseudo-Hyginus, 57.  The authorship of this manual is uncertain, and it is ascribed here to Hyginus by 
convention only. 
 
97Plutarch, Ant., 47. 
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years later against Caesarean forces in the civil wars.98  A general with greater ambition (and 
more skilled engineers) could reroute watercourses entirely.  Julius Caesar most famously 
employed this tactic shortly before the Battle of Dyrrhachium.  As he himself recounts, “all the 
streams and all the rivulets which ran to the sea Caesar had either diverted or blocked by great 
works; and as the district was hilly and rugged he had dammed the narrow defiles by sinking 
piles into the ground and heaping up the earth, so as to keep in the water.”99 
Despite their vulnerability to enemy action, flowing surface water remained the Romans’ 
primary source of drinking water.  What then of wells?  More flexible in their location, wells 
tapped reserves of groundwater which were nearly impossible for an enemy to pollute or disrupt.  
We could reasonably expect them to play a significant role in Roman water logistics.  However, 
literary evidence suggests that the legions avoided well-digging if at all possible. 
To be sure, our sources indicate that the Roman army was technically capable of 
provisioning water by digging wells.  According to Caesar’s own account of the civil wars, 
Pompey sunk numerous wells as the two opponents jockeyed for position before the Battle of 
Dyrrhachium.100  Plutarch writes that Pompey used a similar tactic during the Mithridatic Wars, 
while Caesar evidently used wells on campaign in Alexandria and Africa.101  Finally, both Livy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98Sallust, Jug., 55; Appian, B.Civ.. 2.7.44. 
 
99Caesar, B.Civ.. 3.49: “omnia enim flumina atque omnes rivos, qui ad mare pertinebant, Caesar aut 
averterat aut magnis operibus obstruxerat, atque ut erant loca montuosa et ad specus angustiae vallium, 
has sublicis in terram demissis praesepserat terramque adgesserat, ut aquam continerent.”  BAtlas (2000), 
49 B2 Dyrr(h)achium/Epidamnos. 
    
100Caesar, B.Civ., 3.49. 
 
101Plutarch, Pomp., 32.2; Caesar, B.Alex., 8-9; B.Afr., 51.  The Alexandrian and African Wars, along with 
Caesar’s commentary on the wars in Spain, are generally regarded as pseudonymous.   
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and Plutarch report that Aemilius Paulus sunk wells to assuage his troops’ thirst during the 
Republic’s wars against Perseus.102 
 Although such evidence indicates that well digging was a possible method of water-
provisioning in Roman warfare, we may be quite certain that it was not the legions’ preferred 
option.  Indeed, Caesar’s commentary on Dyrrhachium (first discussed above) notes that Pompey 
turned to wells only because Caesar’s troops had diverted or dammed the streams flowing to his 
position, and that the labor of well-digging strained the Pompeians’ endurance.103  Appian comes 
to a similar conclusion on the undesirability of wells in his own history of the civil wars.  
Narrating Antony’s campaign against the Republicans, he contrasts Cassius and Brutus’ 
outstanding campsite with Antony’s poor situation: “the former were on elevated ground, the 
latter on the plain; the former procured fuel from the mountains, the latter from the marshes; the 
former obtained water from a river, the latter from wells freshly dug.”104 Evidently, wells were 
the legion’s water-source of last resort, not of choice. 
Ancient sources never explicitly explain why the legions preferred not to utilize well 
water, but we may hazard some reasonable guesses.  The quality of well water could be suspect, 
particularly since troops digging a shaft for one night’s use could hardly be expected to properly 
line it with wood or stone so as not to muddy its water.105  Compared with rivers or springs, 
wells provide a small volume of water at a low rate of speed: little over 15 L/minute according to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102Livy, 44.33; Plutarch, Paul., 14.1. 
 
103Caesar, B.Civ., 3.49. 
 
104Appian, B.Civ., 4,107; Gilliver (1999), p. 71. 
 
105On poor quality well water, see Appian, B.Pun. 7.40.  The “villainous” (deterimma) water in Horace 
(Satires, 1.5.7-9) probably also came from local wells.  It should be noted that Pliny praises the quality of 
well water (NH, 31.38-39).  On lining wells, Vitruvius, De Arch., 8.6.12-15; Humphrey, Oleson, and 
Sherwood (1998), ch. 8; Wikander (2000), I.3. 
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modern estimates.106  Most importantly, well digging was labor intensive; note the fatigue of 
Pompey’s diggers at Dyrrhachium.107  Encamping at the end of a day’s march, legionaries 
already bore the burdens of foraging, food-preparation, maintenance of weapons and armor, and 
the fortification of the camp itself.  Added to this list, the labor of well-digging would have been 
onerous. 
The strenuous effort of well-digging limited the areas in which armies could feasibly sink 
wells.  To conserve time and labor, wells could be dug only in spots with extremely shallow 
water tables.  For a temporary well built under the time constraints of the campaign, a water table 
even a couple meters deep would have been out of the legions’ reach: according to Peace Corps 
training manuals, an experienced team of laborers using hand tools alone can sink only one meter 
of well-shaft in a day’s work.108  Determining where water could be struck at such a shallow 
depth strained the capacities of ancient science.109  Indeed, both Aemilius Paulus and Pompey are 
praised for their ability to “read” the landscape and locate sites where wells could easily hit 
water.110  We should not assume that the typical Roman commander was so skilled (or so lucky); 
in many areas well-digging would have proved both laborious and fruitless. 
 For all the reasons above, Roman commanders preferred not to dig wells on campaign.  
But what of preexisting wells, already constructed by the local population?  What, for that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106Olley (2008), p. 6.  See also, Wikander (2000), I.3.  For a modern example of wells’ limited rates of 
water extraction hampering military logistics, see Preston (1921): during WWI in Syria, Preston’s 
mounted infantry unit did not have sufficient time to water all of its mounts at wells. 
 
107Caesar, B.Civ., 3.49. 
 
108Brush (1980), p. 15. 
 
109On water divining, Vitruvius, De Arch., 8.1; Cassiodorus, Letters, 3.53. 
 
110Pompey: Plutarch, Pomp., 32.2  Aemilius Paulus: Livy, 44.33; Plutarch, Paul., 14.1. 
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matter, of other pre-constructed water architecture, such as cisterns and aqueducts?  Surely a 
Roman general would consider these already extant water sources when planning his campaign. 
 The answer to this question is a resounding “maybe.”  There is some ancient literary 
evidence suggesting the legions’ use of pre-dug wells; the Garamantes of North Africa certainly 
felt it necessary to conceal or collapse well shafts as the Romans advanced on their desert 
homeland.111  Comparanda and common sense certainly suggest that the Romans would use local 
wells when they were available.112  Yet while relying on preexisting wells freed the legionaries 
from the labor of digging, other issues with wells would have persisted.  Except at artisanal wells 
(where underground pressure forces water above ground), time and labor were still required to 
lift water from the water table to the surface; by modern estimates a human using a rope and 
pulley system can extract only 10-15 L of water per minute from a 10 m well.113  At this rate, a 
well could certainly provision a small squad, but extracting the water requirement of a full legion 
would be laborious indeed, and extracting the water requirement of that legion’s mounts and 
pack-animals would be nearly impossible.  Large clusters of wells, such as might be found in the 
desert at oasis centers, could perhaps suffice: a field of 20 wells can meet the water requirements 
of a legion in about 3 hours at minimum.114  Yet most desert communities were quite small and 
had no need for so many wells.  In addition, as was the case with finding suitable locations to dig 
wells, finding pre-built wells would require either a detailed knowledge of local geography or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111Pliny, NH, 5.5,35; Appian, B.Civ., 2.7.44 may also refer to Roman use of local wells.  
 
112Maurice (1930), p. 221.  On the British campaign at Gaza-Beersheba during World War I, “the future 
success of the operation hung upon finding the wells of Beersheba intact, as fortunately they were.” 
 
113Olley (2008), p. 6.  Wells in the ancient world were typically 3-25 m deep: Wikander (1999), I.3.   
 
114Assuming 20 wells producing water at 15 L/minute, along with our lower estimate of a legion’s water 
requirement at 51,500 L/day. 
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skilled and trustworthy guides (and we know of several cases in which local guides proved less 
than reliable).115  Finally, pre-built wells were quite easy for an enemy to disrupt, whether by 
poison, pollution, or outright destruction (as in the case of the Garamantes above).  As a result, a 
general who trusted his water supply to the availability of pre-dug wells courted disaster. 
 Cisterns and aqueducts (along with other methods of channeling and storing water for 
irrigation or human consumption) provide a thornier problem.  Legionaries waging urban 
warfare certainly might make use of the monumental water features so typical in Roman cities; 
Caesar’s men drew water from the aqueducts, cisterns, and fountains of Alexandria during their 
combat there against Ganymede.116  However, urban water systems were subject to tampering, as 
Caesar’s troops learned when Ganymede diverted seawater into the network of Alexandrian 
conduits.117  Moreover, large scale water systems were unavailable outside of major cities, and 
so could not generally supply Roman troops in the field.   
 Cisterns, however, existed even in small settlements, particularly in desert environments 
where water was particularly precious.118  Roman armies could potentially make use of the water 
from village cisterns while on campaign, although there is no mention in ancient literature of 
them doing so.  At capacity, even the cisterns for tiny settlements could meet the legion’s needs; 
rainfall in the desert is generally unpredictable and torrential, and locals built large reservoirs and 
extensive catchment systems to stockpile water against future droughts.  Ancient cisterns along 
the desert coast of Syrtica (the large gulf in the center of the modern Libyan coast) typically had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115Cassius Dio, 37.3; Strabo, 16.4.24. 
 
116Caesar, B.Alex., 5. 
 
117Caesar, B.Alex., 6. 
 
118Barker (1996), v.1, p. 10; Evenari (1982), ch. 9-10; Mattingly (1994), pp. 148, 157; Wikkander (1999), 
I.2. 
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capacities between 40,000 and 200,000 liters.119  In the Tripolitanian desert fringe just to the 
west, several noteworthy cisterns have measured capacities of 90,000-165,000 L.120 Even in the 
comparatively well-watered hills of central Tunisia, where massive cisterns were less necessary, 
capacities ranged from 10,000-100,000 L.121   
Based on these figures, we might certainly suspect that cisterns could provision adequate 
water supplies to sizeable Roman armies, particularly in villages with several cisterns.  Yet 
several caveats are in order.  First, depending on their design, drawing water from cisterns may 
have required time and labor comparable to extracting water from wells.  Unlike the banks of a 
river or a spring-fed pool, only a few men could physically access a cistern at any one time, and 
the cramped confines of a typical village cistern hardly lent themselves to the efficient filling of 
canteens.122  In addition, cisterns were frequently the only water source for desert settlements, 
where water collected from a single torrential rainstorm might need to provide for the local 
inhabitants and their livestock for an entire year.  If a Roman army of hundreds or thousands 
drew water from cisterns meant for dozens, they could fatally deplete the community’s water 
stores.  In hostile territory beyond the empire’s borders, a commander might see this as an added 
benefit, warfare by dehydration.123  Within the bounds of Roman rule or among friendly 
neighbors, a conscientious or diplomatic commander might weigh the logistical availability of 
cistern water against the strategic consequences of embittering and endangering local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119Barker (1996), v.1, pp. 134-136. 
 
120Barker (1996), v.1, pp. 134-136. 
 
121Bergaoui and Gammar (1990). 
 
122On cistern design: Bergaoui and Gammar (1990). 
 
123Similarly, Roman generals plundered the food supplies of hostile populations not only to meet the 
needs of their soldiers, but to compel the starving enemy to give battle or surrender.  Roth (1999), ch. 3. 
	  	   38	  
populations.  Finally, a general who put his faith in cisterns risked disaster if those cisterns were 
depleted by unexpected drought; when planning a campaign, a commander could never count on 
any particular cistern being full enough to provision sufficient water for his thirsty troops.  
In summary, the list of water sources available to Roman armies was rather bleak.  Rivers 
and springs were certainly the best sources available to ancient commanders.  Where these were 
abundant, adequate water supplies would have been generally easy to secure, and the geographic 
availability of water would not severely limit the possibilities of Roman warfare.  Where rivers 
and springs were scarce, as they were in the deserts along Rome’s southern and eastern borders, 
commanders had no other good options.  Even in areas where the water table lay within the reach 
of ancient technology, forces on the march could not dig wells quickly enough to meet their 
needs.  Pre-existing wells and cisterns would suffice for small squads, but a host of problems 
made them a risky proposition for even a single legion.  As a result, Roman armies must have 
been severely limited by their reliance on rivers and springs; unable to carry water and only 
tentatively able to exploit water already tapped by human construction, the Romans could 
campaign flexibly and comfortably only in areas where water was well provisioned by nature. 
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5. Tripolitania, Water Logistics, and Strategic Limitations 
 
To this point, this thesis has demonstrated the theoretical limits which water logistics 
imposed on ancient Roman legions.  The daunting water requirements of large armies combined 
with the shortfalls of ancient technology indicate that Roman armies in arid regions would have 
been severely curtailed in where they could go and what they could accomplish.  It remains to 
apply the theoretical model of Roman military water logistics outlined above to a specific 
landscape, exploring how Roman commanders might have been constrained by the hydro-
geography of an actual desert. For this purpose, Tripolitania (Map 1) will serve as a suitable case 
study.124  
Although Tripolitania was administered as part of Africa Proconsularis until the reforms 
of Diocletian, it comprised a distinct geographic entity.  To the east, the rugged Gebel hills 
divided Tripolitania from Africa proper; most travel between the region and the urbanized 
heartland of the former Carthaginian empire was forced to pass through the narrow coastal plain 
south of Tacape.  The same highlands hampered traffic to the south, where hundreds of 
kilometers of wastes stood between Roman Tripolitania and the densely populated Garamantian 
oases.  And to the east, the vast expanse of the Syrtic gulf separated Tripolitania from the major 
coastal cities of Cyrenaica. Our area of GIS inquiry roughly corresponds with these geographic 
lines of demarcation, running roughly from Tacape (10°E) to the center of the Syrtic Gulf 
(17°E), and from the Mediterranean coast to the southernmost Garamantian oases (25°N).  	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Though this southern boundary pushes well past the inland limits of Roman control, it allows us 
to examine the logistical problems of imperial campaigns into hostile territory, which played a 
crucial deterrent role in the security of the “Roman” coast. 
Rome’s most important military objective in this area was to defend the major towns on 
the Tripolitanian coast, most notably Sabratha, Oea, and Lepcis Magna (the τρεῖς πόλεις from 
which the region takes its name).  Originally Punic settlements, after the conquest of Tripolitania 
in the 1st centuy BCE these cities rapidly became the focal points of imperial presence and 
interest.  Politically connected, economically important, and thoroughly Romanized, they were 
natural priorities for the imperial army.  Properly defending the coastal cities required the army 
to expand both its territorial and hegemonic control inland.  Tribes near the coast fell under 
direct Roman control, and were annexed into the province of Africa Proconsularis.  Further into 
the desert, punitive raids and diplomatic missions checked any native threat to the valuable urban 
areas to the north.125   
The physical geography of Tripolitania tested the Roman military’s capacity to complete 
its defensive mission.  As Map 2 demonstrates, Tripolitania is an arid place; even the 
comparatively rainy stretch of coast between Oea (modern Tripoli) and Lepcis Magna (near 
modern Homs) receives on average only 300 mm of annual precipitation.  The terrain turns to 
pre-desert on fringes of the Sahara at most 100 km to the south, where the 200 mm isohyet marks 
the boundary beyond which cereals cannot be produced on any scale without intensive 
irrigation.126  To be sure, sparse rainfall did not directly impact the water logistics of Roman 
armies.  Troops would rely on collected rainwater only in exceptional situations, and a general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125Barker (1996); Mattingly (1994). 
 
126For comparison, 200 mm of rainfall is roughly equivalent to the average precipitation of Phoenix, 
Arizona. 
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could never plan for such an occurrence.127  However, scarce and erratic rainfall was largely 
responsible for the lack of any perennial Tripolitanian watercourses; the wadi valleys carved 
through the region’s landscape fill with water only after sudden downpours.  As a result, Roman 
commanders in Tripolitania did not have access to one of their two preferred water sources.  
Unable to rely on rivers or streams to meet their water needs, they were limited to the few oases 
and springs scattered throughout the parched landscape. 
Moreover, the military dynamics of the Tripolitanian frontier required the Romans to 
engage in a particularly mobile form of campaigning, one that was particularly limited by the 
scarcity of local water sources.  At least until the reign of Septimius Severus, Tripolitania 
possessed only a very small Roman garrison and few permanent defensive fortifications.128  Even 
after Severus strengthened the frontier south of his hometown of Lepcis, Roman military strength 
in Tripolitania never reached the levels achieved in Britain, Germany, or Syria.  Imperial security 
on such a sparsely manned and fortified frontier depended to a great degree on the ability of 
Roman units to move flexibly over long distances in order to meet foreign and domestic threats.  
As we will see, reconstructing the hydro-geography of Tripolitania suggests that water logistics 
greatly hampered such rapid-response campaigns, and hindered the Roman’s ability to wield 
military force within the region. 
***** 
To what extent can we accurately map the water sources that would have been available 
to Roman troops in Tripolitania?  Such a task is obviously a difficult one, and two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127Such exceptional occurrences instances may be nothing more than literary tropes meant to demonstrate 
a commander’s luck or divine favor.  See Herod’s good fortune at Masada (Josephus, BJ, 1.286-287), 
Marcus Aurelius’ “rain miracle” against the Quadi (Coarelli (2008), pp. 51, 140-142; Cassius Dio, 71.10), 
and Alexander’s divine protection on his desert march to Siwah (Engels (1978), p. 52). 
 
128Barker (1996), pp. 112-116, 324-325; Mattingly (1994), ch. 4, 5.   
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methodological questions immediately arise.  First, can we assume that the amount of water 
available in Roman Tripolitania was comparable to the amount of water available today?  Some 
scholars have certainly suggested that the climate of the ancient Mediterranean was significantly 
more humid than the modern climate: Claudio Vita-Finzi’s work in the 1960s on geomorphology 
remains foundational to this argument.129  However, extensive data collected as part of the 
UNESCO Libyan Valley Survey (ULVS) strongly reject it.130 On these grounds, we may safely 
say that fresh water sources were not more widely available in the Roman period than they are 
today, and that modern GIS data should provide us with roughly the correct number of oases, 
springs, and other water sites. 
A second question: would ancient water sources necessarily be in the same locations as 
water sources today?  This question is difficult to answer decisively, but we may be tentatively 
confident that our GIS data roughly corresponds in location with water sources that would have 
been available to the ancient Romans.  This is particularly true for Tripolitania, where fresh 
water sources are limited to springs and oases due to the lack of perennial rivers or streams.  
Rivers may change course over centuries as erosion and sedimentation alter the landscape.  The 
locations of oases and springs, on the other hand, are based on the configuration of geological 
strata below the earth’s surface, occurring at places where aquifers approach or reach ground 
level.131  As a result, the locations of these water sources should change only on a geological 
timescale; 2,000 years will not have significantly altered their positions.  This conclusion is 
supported by the frequent correlation between modern oases and springs and attested ancient 
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settlements.  To this day, the sites of Roman Tripolitania’s three great cities are watered by 
coastal springs and the ruins of Garamantian settlements still stand on their ancient oases. 
With these methodological concerns put to rest, what data sources can we use to map 
springs and oases?  Map 3 employs four data sets to display the most likely water sources in 
Tripolitania and the surrounding regions.  It includes all Libyan and Tunisian springs and oases 
listed in the GeoNames database, a massive Swiss GIS data aggregation project.132  All oasis and 
well sites from the Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World have been digitally traced 
and included, as have oasis sites from Mattingly’s definitive monograph on Roman 
Tripolitania.133  A fourth data set is compiled from the list of Tripolitanian oases and springs 
recorded in the 1920 Handbook of Libya, an exceptionally detailed geographic survey produced 
by the British Naval Intelligence Service.134 
We may be reasonably certain, though not entirely positive, that this map includes all 
major oasis and spring sites in Tripolitania, the most likely sites at which a large concentration of 
Roman troops could count on finding water.  In fact, this map may even overestimate the number 
of possible watering sites for Roman armies.  Though oases are often associated with springs, 
ground water does not breach the surface at all such sites.  Even where water does come to the 
surface, it may be of poor quality or insufficient quantity.135  To be sure, such deficient oases still 
have a greater ability to meet military water needs than the deserts that surround them.  Oases’ 	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133BAtlas (2000), 35-37; Mattingly (1994), Fig. 1:2, 2:5. 
 
134Geographical Section (1920).  Sadly, only those sites from the Handbook which could be located on 
Google Maps or OpenStreetMap are included (not always an easy task given the changes in toponyms 
over a century and the inevitable vagaries of Arabic-English transliteration). In the interests of efficiency, 
I chose not to include the numerous oases the Handbook recorded in the vicinity of ancient Garama, as 
these were well mapped by both Mattingly (1994) and the Barrington Atlas. 
 
135Geographical Section (1920), pp. 144, 160. 
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inhabitants may well have sunk numerous wells into the shallow water table beneath their feet, 
perhaps even enough wells to meet the needs of sizeable Roman armies.136  Nevertheless, we 
should not assume that every point on Map 3 could successfully water a Roman army; sites 
included on this map which offer insufficient water should more than compensate for any 
potential watering sites that have been omitted. 
What of the lower order water sources discussed above, such as cisterns and wells 
already constructed by local populations?  Such sources could certainly have supplied small 
contingents of Roman troops, and in ideal circumstances might even have met the water needs of 
entire armies.  Needless to say, these sites are practically impossible to plot with total accuracy.  
Even in areas covered by extensive survey archaeology, it would be unreasonable to expect the 
discovery of more than a fraction of ancient wells and cisterns; in most of Roman Tripolitania, 
we lack even the limited data sets that landscape archaeologists can provide.  That said, we can 
attempt to indicate where ancient cisterns and wells were likely to appear by employing recent 
advances in satellite imaging.  For this purpose, Maps 4, 5, and 6 illustrate a fifth and final data 
set: the first displays maximum green vegetation fraction (MGVF) data for Tripolitania and its 
environs.  Developed by researchers at the University of Arizona, MGVF mapping divides the 
Earth’s land surface into 1 km squares, and indicates the maximum percentage of each square 
covered by green vegetation in the average year (based on satellite imagery from 2001-2012).137  
Grid squares with higher MGVF values will have more readily available water, whether through 
groundwater sources or human irrigation.  Map 5 is an altered display of the same data, 
indicating sites at which Roman troops have some chance of procuring water; grid squares with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136British geographers certainly found this to be the case in oasis sites such as Mizda or Kasr Beni Ulid.  
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wells, see above, pp. 33-35.  
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MGVFs of 15% or higher are indicated in green, squares with lower MGVFs appear in white.138  
Map 6 is simply a digital trace of Map 5, converting the “flat” image of the original dataset into 
more easily manipulable GIS shape files. 
We cannot claim that the water sources indicated by this MGVF data necessarily existed 
in the ancient world.  This is particularly true since many areas on this map which now support 
agriculture do so only thanks to human irrigation schemes.  Indeed, we must omit entirely the 
cross-hatched area in Map 6, a stretch of land made “green” only by the suburban outgrowth of 
modern Tripoli and Muammar Gaddafi’s completion in the early 1990s of the “Great Man-Made 
River,” a colossal aqueduct bringing water from aquifers deep beneath the Sahara to the coastal 
capital.139 We cannot assume that every relatively well-watered site on Map 6 was inhabited in 
antiquity, just as we cannot assume that the potential farmstead at such a site would have wells or 
cisterns on the scale necessary to provision a Roman army.  What we can claim is that the sites 
with high MGVF values indicated on Map 6 are more likely to have provided adequate water in 
antiquity than the comparatively barren regions surrounding them. 
MGVF data combines with the four datasets described above to produce a “master map” 
of potential water sources for the Roman military in Tripolitania (Map 7).  Though it is certainly 
possible that some water sources are omitted from this map, in all likelihood it overestimates the 
frequency of water sources in Tripolitania.  Not every site marked on this map would necessarily 
provide Roman troops with adequate water, though all might have; this holds particularly true for 
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the water sources tentatively derived from MGVF data.140  We may also reasonably doubt that a 
Roman commander could locate all the water sources on this map, particularly isolated oases 
deep in the desert. 
This overestimation of water availability in Roman Tripolitania is no accident.  First, it is 
my hope and belief that water sources included on this map which do not provide adequate water 
more than compensate for any locations which would offer adequate drinking water but do not 
appear here.  Second, it is the central contention of this paper that water supplies limited the 
possibilities of Roman military action in the field.  This argument is strengthened if it succeeds 
in spite of the intentional overestimation of water availability.  If Roman forces would have been 
constrained even on this overly generous map of local water supplies, they would have been all 
the more restricted in the more arid landscape of Tripolitania as it (in all probability) actually 
existed. 
Based on the “master map,” where in Tripolitania could Roman troops actually wage 
war?  This, fortunately, is a relatively simple calculation.  Walter Scheidel and the ORBIS 
Project claim that a Roman army can travel 30 km in a day.141  This is a high estimate even on 
well-built Roman roads; it would probably be unattainable over the rocky wastes of the 
Tripolitanian highlands.  Nevertheless, in the interests of overestimation, let us suppose that a 
Roman force can cover 30 km in a day.  As we argued above, Roman forces did not carry large 
quantities of water with them, and refilled their water skins at least once per day except under 
extraordinary circumstances.  Therefore, Roman troops could, under general conditions, access 
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was less likely for Roman troops to find adequate water at these sites than at sites drawn from the first 
four datasets. 
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any point within 15 km of a water source.142  This radius of accessibility is indicated on Map 8: 
any shaded area is within a day’s march of a water source.143  In addition, if the 15 km circles 
surrounding two water sources overlap, a Roman army could travel between those sites without 
taking the exceptional step of transporting multiple days’ worth of water. 
This map immediately and decisively demonstrates the extent to which water logistics 
limited Roman action in Tripolitania.  Sizeable swaths of territory both within and beyond the 
Roman frontier (ultimately established along the Gebel hills) were generally inaccessible to 
imperial armies.  From the empire’s perspective, the Gefara plain lying between the oases of the 
coast and the Gebel hills on the desert fringe must have been particularly troubling (Map 9).144  
To be sure, no large-scale military threat could originate from such barren wastes; the Gefara 
was mostly uninhabited in antiquity (as it remains today), and the same dearth of water sources 
that kept out Roman troops would also have excluded sizeable enemy forces.145  Nevertheless, 
the existence of this inaccessible “pocket” within Roman territory could have hampered effective 
policing of the region.  Comparative evidence from across the Roman empire suggests that 
landscapes harsh enough to exclude the Roman military often served as places of refuge for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142It should be noted that this 15 km radius does not allow said Roman force to accomplish anything of 
significance.  It would spend half a standard “work-day” marching out from its water source and another 
half-day marching back in (or to another water source), leaving precious little time to conduct military 
operations. 
 
143As with Map 7, sites derived from MGVF data are marked differently than sites from the first four 
datasets.  Areas accessible only from such sites are shaded in a lighter color, indicating that they are less 
likely to be accessible to Roman soldiers, and particularly to large concentrations of troops. 
 
144The barren aridity of the Gefara is supported by Google Earth satellite imagery and by Mattingly 
(1994), p. 6. 
 
145On the lack of major settlements, BAtlas (2000), 35. 
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bandits and fugitives.146  The highlands of Trachonitis in Syria preserved brigands from the 
wrath of Herod and Rome; El-Leja, the modern name for this rugged plateau, means “refuge” in 
Arabic.147  The mountains of Iberia protected the Cantabri of Spain from the Republic for two 
centuries, to the point where Marcus Agrippa, after his victory over the tribe in 19 BCE, forced 
them “to move from their settlements in the mountains down into the more controllable 
valleys.”148 Deserts could play a similar role as refuges for guerillas and insurgents; it is for this 
reason that Lucullus in Plutarch’s account refused to immediately attack Mithridates, knowing 
that his wily foe, faced with a superior Roman army, would vanish into the “vast and trackless 
desert behind him.”149  Although the barren Gefara just off the Tripolitanian coast may never 
have played host to a refugee as singularly menacing as Mithridates, it may well have offered a 
hideout and base of operations to the low-level criminals, fugitive slaves, and political dissidents 
of Roman Tripolitania. 
Thanks to its lack of water sources, the Gefara plain also severely hindered the ability of 
Roman armies to move within Tripolitania in response to threats.  To be sure, it was relatively 
easy for Roman forces to move east and west through the province by one of two routes.  Water 
was readily available inland along the fringe of the Gebel hills; troops could “hop” from one 
source to the next within a day’s march, with small but troublesome arid gaps appearing only in 
the east and west of the region.  Ultimately, this line of hills formed the core of the Roman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146Bear in mind that while the desert plain of Tripolitania did not have sufficient water to provision a 
sizeable contingent of Roman troops, it may have yielded enough water to meet the needs of small bands 
of bandits and fugitives, particularly if such individuals knew the local terrain well. 
 
147Isaac (1984), p. 175. 
 
148Richardson (2012), p. 92. 
 
149Plutarch, Luc., 14.5. 
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military frontier by the Severan period, in large part because it offered adequate water to the 
empire’s armies.150  Armies could also move laterally along the Mediterranean coast, though 
large forces might well have struggled to cross the dry gap between Oea and Lepcis.151  In fact, 
the difficulty of water logistics in this arid stretch might explain the delayed arrival of Roman 
auxiliaries to Lepcis in 69 CE, during the war between Lepcis and Oea; the Oeans, aided by 
mercenary tribesmen from the desert, were able to besiege Lepcis and lay waste to its 
countryside before Roman forces were able to relieve the beleaguered city.152 
Despite the potential challenges of the dry coast west of Lepcis Magna, lateral movement 
between the eastern and western ends of Roman Tripolitania was relatively unhindered by a 
dearth of water supplies.  However, the barren Gefara severely hindered vertical movement 
within the region; Roman troops could not easily move north and south between the relatively 
well-watered coast and the Gebel.  Based on the availability of water supplies, armies could 
cross between the two bands only at their eastern and western ends, where they come together 
near Tacape and Lepcis.  At no point in between is a north-south transit of the Gefara possible 
without taking exceptional measures to provision water. 
This geographic restriction of movement posed a serious threat to Roman security in the 
region.  In the event that an enemy struck out of the desert at Severus’ Gebel fortifications, 
troops from the coast could not rapidly move inland to respond.  And in the event of disturbances 
along the coast, such as the Oea-Lepcis war in 69, troops stationed along the Gebel could not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150Mattingly (1994), p. 83.  See also ch. 3, note 35. 
 
151The actual aridity of this reason is questionable, particularly since MGVF data cannot be included here 
due to the immense impact of the Great Man-Made River (see above, p. 43-44).  There was certainly 
settlement in the area in the Roman period: BAtlas (2000), 35 F2 & G2. 
 
152Tacitus, Hist., 4.50; Mattingly (1994), p. 71. 
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easily redeploy north.153  This immobility was particularly dangerous given the limited numbers 
of troops along the Tripolitanian frontier.  The entire province of Africa Proconsularis was 
garrisoned by only a single legion, and until the reorganization of the frontier by Septimius 
Severus no sizeable contingent of that force was stationed in Tripolitania itself.154  Though the 
few legionaries in Tripolitania were no doubt supplemented by auxiliaries, the fact remains that 
their numbers were woefully inadequate for a frontier some 700 km long.  The ability of the 
Romans to protect and monitor this boundary depended on the tactical flexibility of their forces, 
on the ability of scattered contingents to shift and unite in response to threats.  By preventing 
vertical movement between the coast and the Gebel, the barren Gefara physically divided the 
already undermanned Roman forces and badly compromised regional security. 
The presence of the Gefara within the borders of Roman Tripolitania was obviously a 
complicating factor in the region’s defense, both as a refuge for small bands of non-traditional 
combatants and as an obstacle to Roman response to larger-scale military threats.  Yet all in all 
the Gefara was a rather small desert within an otherwise well-watered area.  Even in the driest, 
western sector of the plain, a Roman force would be only two days march (roughly 60 km) from 
the nearest water supply.  Though north-south crossings could not be made without carrying 
water, such crossings would be relatively brief and relatively achievable (particularly for small 
forces which would require fewer additional pack animals).  Perhaps most importantly, crossings 
of this desert would have been relatively safe, since a Roman commander could fully trust in the 
availability of adequate water on the desert’s far side.  To the south of the Gebel hills, none of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153To be sure, it is uncertain that there were Roman troops in the Gebel at such an early date. 
 
154Le Bohec (1989); Mann (1974).  Contra Mattingly (1989, 1994) who argues that small vexillationes 
from the Legio III Augusta were installed along the Tripolitanian border.  Even if his view is accepted, 
my point still stands: the number of legionaries in Tripolitania before Severus would have been hundreds 
at the most.   
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these factors held true.  The Gefara desert was inconvenient and troublesome for Roman forces 
securing Tripolitania.  The rugged plateau of the Hamada al-Hamra, dryer and immensely larger, 
presented a much more severe threat to provincial security. 
The principal threat of the Hamada al-Hamra came not from the plateau itself, but from 
the Saharan tribes it protected to the south.  For the first century of Roman rule in Tripolitania, 
the sizeable tribal confederation known as the Garamantes presented the greatest threat to the 
region.155  Striking on horseback from their desert oases, the Garamantes fought on Tripolitanian 
soil during the Gaetulian War (3 BCE-6 CE), the revolt of Tacfarinas (17-24 CE), and the 
Lepcis-Oea war (69 CE).156  Though these are the only conflicts recorded in the literary record, 
low-level raiding by Garamantes and other desert dwellers probably persisted throughout the 1st 
centuries BCE and CE.  For their part, the Romans launched punitive expeditions against the 
Garamantes in 19 BCE under Cornelius Balbus, as well as in response to Garamantian 
involvement in the Gaetulian and Lepcis-Oea wars.  Such deterrent strikes were a key weapon in 
Rome’s imperial arsenal; striking across the frontiers, legions would devastate “barbarian” 
homelands, forcing tribes to come to terms and accept Roman hegemony.  Though these 
borderlands were not generally annexed into the empire, they were left pacified, pliable, and 
thoroughly impressed with Roman wrath.  In short, by making war across the frontiers, Roman 
armies won peace on the frontiers.157 
Map 10 suggests just how difficult this strategy was to execute on the Tripolitanian 
frontier.  There were certainly ways through the broad desert separating Romans and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155Daniels (1970, 1989); Enc.Berb. s.v. Garamantes, 19.2969-2971.  
 
156Mattingly (1994), ch. 3, 4. 
 
157Luttwak (1976), ch. 1. 
 
	  	   52	  
Garamantes.158  Every year, transhumant herders would follow these tracks on their way to and 
from pastures near the coast; lightly armed and fast-moving Garamantian raiders presumably 
used the same paths to strike Roman territory.  Yet water supplies along these routes were 
generally inadequate for a Roman force of any considerable size.159   
According to our data, only four potential paths lead south through the desert.  The 
westernmost path is clearly unsuitable for a Roman expedition.  Troops would first have to travel 
from the Gebel crescent to Cidamus, an oasis site ultimately garrisoned by Septimius Severus; 
this transit alone requires a Roman army to undertake two waterless marches of about 100 km 
(3.5 days) each, assuming troops passed through the band of oases centered on Chawan.  Based 
on our data, further progress south was impossible for our army: over 450 km (15 days) separates 
Cidamus from the nearest water site to the south.160 
To the east, a second route, only slightly more practicable, runs southeast from the oasis 
at Derg.  Again, troops from the north would have to undertake protracted desert marches even to 
reach Derg.  According to Mattingly, the next water source is a well 110 km (3.5 days) due 
southeast, though a more sensible route might have cut south through the springs of Ayn’ al-
Barbi before turning east towards the well (an itinerary which requires two desert crossings of 
approximately 50 and 70 km but adds 20 km in total distance).  In all likelihood, a Roman army 
could not march beyond this point.  230 km (7.5 days) of desert lie between this well and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158The routes in Map 10 follow Mattingly (1994), Figure 2.5. 
 
159Campaigns against the Garamantes would have required large numbers of soldiers.  Charles Daniels 
(1989) estimates that the confederation comprised at least 10,000 people. 
 
160In the Encyclopédie Berbère, Pol Trousset claims that Cornelius Balbus took this route to Garama. 
Enc.Berb. s.v. Fezzan, 18.2802-2803. 
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next water source; by our model, transporting water over such a distance was well beyond the 
Romans’ logistical capacity.161  
Route three would have been technically possible for Roman armies to travel, though the 
journey would not be an easy one.  Travel as far south as Gheriat el-Garbia need not have 
required any particular hardships, provided that the MGVF-derived water-sources on either side 
of Mizda were actually present and sufficient for the army’s needs.  The Romans would make 
their first desert transit at this point, marching about 100 km (3.5 days) between Gheriat el-
Garbia and Schwerif.  The legion would then march roughly 160 km (5.5 days) south by 
southwest to the spring at Thamad al-Uhaymir.162  After moving southeast along a band of 
springs and wells, the army would turn south, crossing a last stretch of desert 80 km (2.5 days) 
wide before finally striking upon the northernmost oases of the Garamantian homeland.  Though 
the only achievable option so far, this path would severely tax the Roman logistical apparatus.  
Large numbers of pack animals would be required, and a 5.5 day waterless march was nearly 
beyond the bounds of possibility.  Any delay, any diversion, any wrong turn across the wastes 
would spell catastrophe. 
Based on our data, the fourth, easternmost march of attack was by far the most practical.  
A Roman army would set out from Gholaia, though reaching this oasis from the north requires 
an 80 km (2.5 days) transit of the waterless stretch of the wadi basin south of Wadi Zem Zem.  
The largest expanse of desert lies south of Gholaia: it is 190 km (6.5 days) to the oasis at Hun, 
though the trip could be divided into two waterless segments of 100 km (3.5 days) if the green 
enclave on the northeast edge of the Hamada al-Hamra was extant in antiquity and provided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161See above, pp. 12-27. 
 
162Based on our map of water-availability, Mattingly’s route appears to proceed too far south before 
turning east, passing a day’s march below two much-needed springs. 
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sufficient water for a Roman force.  From Hun, the army would follow an almost continuous line 
of springs and wells south by southwest until their path joins with route three.  The same 80 km 
(2.5 day) march would then have separated the Roman army from its Garamantian targets.  
Provided that the desert crossing from Gholaia to Hun could have been divided into two 
segments with a water source in between, route four would have presented Roman forces with 
the least extreme waterless march.  Yet as we have discussed above, even such relatively short 
desert transits taxed the Roman logistical apparatus. 
To attack the Garamantes and deter their incessant raiding on the Tripolitania frontier, a 
Roman commander was limited to two routes.  Neither was well watered.  Both required 
significant investments in additional pack-animals as well as significant risks: if a desperately 
needed well ran dry several days from the nearest water source, disaster would ensue.  If the 
Garamantes, as they were evidently wont to do, buried wells in the desert sands to keep them 
from Roman use, disaster would ensue.163  Therefore, as with all expeditions away from local 
sources of water, Roman commanders would enter this desert only rarely, and only under 
extreme circumstances. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Given the hydro-geography of the desert south of Tripolitania, we should marvel that 
Roman armies ever reached the Garamantian homeland.  Campaigns piercing the heart of the 
desert required the greatest exertion of Roman military logistics.  As Mattingly puts it, “Rome’s 
achievement in adapting to desert warfare should not be underestimated.”164  Yet we should also 
not forget that the sheer hostility of the desert landscape typically preserved the Garamantes from 
Roman reprisals.  For all the trouble they caused the Roman empire, the Garamantes were never 
annexed, like the Musulames and Cinithi in what is now Tunisia.165  In a century of intermittent 
warfare, they were invaded only three times, and no permanent Roman garrison ever approached 
their borders.  And although a Roman invasion in 70 CE finally put an end to large-scale 
Garamantian attacks on the coast, we may suspect that it succeeded in this only by offering elite 
tribesman substantial material incentives to maintain the peace; expensive Roman pottery and 
glassware appears in the Garamantian archaeological record around 70 CE, a sign that peace was 
bought as much as it was won.166  The Garamantes were able to threaten Tripolitania so brazenly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164Mattingly (1994), p. 41. 
 
165Mattingly (1994), p. 70.  Like the Garamantes, both tribes were involved in Tacfarinas’ revolt in the 
early 1st Century CE (Tacfarinas himself was a member of the Musulames).  As punishment, both were 
brought under direct Roman rule. 
 
166Mattingly (1994), p. 74.  Contra Daniels (1970), who insists that Roman goods appear as a result of 
equal trade, not as gifts or bribes. 
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for so long because a campaign against them presented almost insurmountable logistical 
challenges.         
 We should not imagine that the challenges outlined here were unique to Roman 
Tripolitania.  The empire confronted deserts all along its southern and eastern frontiers.  Maps 
similar to the ones I have displayed here would, in all likelihood, show just how thoroughly the 
constraints of water logistics stymied Aelius Gallus’ expedition to Arabia Felix, or complicated 
centuries of Roman warfare against Parthians and Persians.167  Ultimately, investigating how 
Roman legions obtained adequate supplies of fresh water highlights the severity of the 
challenges which the empire faced.  Although the Roman army was able to stretch the 
implacable limits of geography through exceptional logistical effort in moments of crisis, under 
normal circumstances biological requirements and technological shortcomings reasserted their 
grip on the Roman military.  On the arid fringes of empire, the Roman army’s ability to move 
and fight was severely limited by its basic need for drinking water. 
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Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from ancient sources come from the Loeb Classical 
Library, an imprint of Harvard University Press.  I have adjusted the Loeb translations as 
necessary. 
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In addition to the printed sources listed above, the GIS work in this thesis is based on the 
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